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HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET: 








This paper proposes a market microstructure model of FX intervention to analyze the 
relationship between central bank intervention and the characteristics of the foreign 
exchange market. The implication of our model is that the characteristic of the exchange rate 
movements around central bank intervention is determined by portfolio managers’ trading 
intensity and their boundary weights on the fundamentalist’s view, market-makers’ price 
adjustment speed and their speculative trading intensity. When the portfolio managers’ 
trading intensity is low (thin market), central bank must operate heavy interventions to move 
spot exchange rate toward a target level. As the portfolio managers’ boundary weight 
(minimum or maximum) on the fundamentalist’s view increases, the influence of 
intervention increases. When the market-makers’ price adjustment speed is fast, central bank 
must operate small interventions. Overall, this paper suggests that central banks need to have 
superior information on the characteristics of the foreign exchange market at the time the 
intervention operations are performed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1973 and the move to a managed 
floating system, central banks of most industrialized countries have intervened in the 
foreign exchange market to reduce exchange rate volatility. Many European countries 
agreed to keep exchange rates within a band around a target level by coordinated 
intervention and U.S. authorities actively engaged in foreign exchange intervention in 
the 1970s. The conventional view on the effectiveness of intervention in the early 1980s 
was that central bank intervention, particularly sterilized intervention, does not offer an 
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effective policy tool for affecting exchange rates.
1  
By early 1985, however, official views were reversed. In the Plaza Agreement of 
September 1985, the G-5 countries announced that “some further orderly appreciation of 
the non-dollar currencies is desirable” and that they stood “ready to cooperate more 
closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful.” Following the Louvre Accord 
in February 1987, the G-7 countries shifted its goal from depreciating the dollar to 
stabilizing exchange rates. As they constituted strong supports for concerted intervention, 
foreign exchange market participants are observed to react to intervention as 
dynamically as to any other sort of news. Studies of intervention policies in the 1980s 
find that intervention had a statistically significant effect on exchange rates.
2
The question of whether central bank intervention operations can effectively 
influence exchange rates is still both an issue of some debate in academia and a 
controversial policy option for central banks. The standard monetary approach to 
exchange rate determination indicates that nonsterilized intervention affects the level of 
the exchange rate in proportion to the change in the relative supplies of domestic and 
foreign money. The effects of sterilized intervention are less direct and more 
controversial. In one view, intervention is not only ineffective in influencing the level of 
the exchange rate, but also risky because it can increase the volatility of the exchange 
rate.
3 Others argue that intervention operations can influence the level of the exchange 
rate, and can also decrease the volatility.
4 Yet others argue that intervention operations 
are inconsequential since they affect neither the level nor the volatility of exchange 
rates.
5
This paper tries to answer the following question which has been the hot issue of the 
recent research. How do heterogeneous market participants react to the central bank 
intervention and how does the change in market traders’ behavior affect exchange rates? 
We assume that central bank has private information about fundamentals and thus its 
intervention operations influence market traders’ trading behavior. This is an alternative 
interpretation of the signalling channel.   
Because of the low transparency of nondealer customer order flows in the foreign 
exchange markets, central bank intervention with private information establishes certain 
dealers as informed traders. If uninformed dealers interpret the change in informed 
dealers’ quotes as a signal of a change in market trend or future monetary policy stance, 
they jump on the bandwagon and the efficacy of central bank intervention may increase. 
To set up a satisfactory model of exchange rate determination, several distinctive 
 
1 See Jurgensen Report (1983), The G-7 Working Group Report. 
2 See Ghosh (1992) and Dominguez and Frankel (1993). 
3 See Rogoff (1984), Lewis (1988), and Baillie and Humpage (1992). 
4 See Mussa (1981), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), and Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Sellon (1997). 
5 See Jurgensen (1983) and Henderson and Sampson (1983). Dominguez (1993) and Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
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characteristics of the foreign exchange market need to be considered. First, while equity 
markets are centralized and based on specialist systems, the foreign exchange market is 
largely decentralized and organized around interbank dealer networks. The interdealer 
share of trading is approximately 80%, much larger than other markets.
6 Second, trading 
motives in the foreign exchange market are different, as they involve both speculative 
and nonspeculative aspects. Third, the transparency of transactions is very low compared 
to other financial markets. 
Section 2 introduces the model with heterogeneous participants in the foreign 
exchange market. Section 2.1 describes the heterogeneity of traders. Section 2.2 
discusses intradaily exchange rate movements in the absence of central bank 
intervention. Section 2.3 presents intradaily exchange rate movements in the presence of 
central bank intervention. Finally, we conclude and summarize the implications of our 
model in Section 3. 
 
 
2.  THE  MODEL 
 
The standard efficient markets model suggests that prices should reflect underlying 
fundamentals. To do this, all information available about fundamentals should be 
incorporated into prices. Yet many of the facts about financial markets seem to be at 
odds with the efficient market model. For example, in the foreign exchange market, it is 
easy to see sudden and substantial changes in exchange rates which are so much more 
volatile than underlying fundamentals. Excessive volatility may happen if market traders 
mimic behavior of others rather than respond to their private information about 
fundamentals. This herding behavior can be rational from the perspective of the 
market-makers whose pricing decision must be consistent with the consensus of the market. 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the efficacy of central bank 
intervention operations and the state of the foreign exchange market. In general, central 
bank intervention operations have a common objective of “countering disorderly 
exchange market conditions” which results in the smoothing of exchange rate volatility 
from day to day and even during the day.
7 In some cases such as EMS, central banks try 
to target the exchange rate to some predetermined level through interventions.
8
 
6 The remaining 20% is between dealers and non-dealer customers. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(1995). 
7 Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) find that an increase in the conditional variance of daily exchange rate 
returns led the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve to increase the volume of intervention, both in case of 
dollar-sales and purchases on account of their leaning against the wind policy. 
8 According to Funabashi (1988), at the Plaza Accord of 1985 the G-5 agreed to coordinated intervention to 
depreciate the dollar: 215 for Yen/$ and 2.60 for DM/$. At the Louvre meeting of 1987, target levels were set 
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In the foreign exchange market, risk-averse market-makers do not want to carry open 
positions. So they begin and end each trading day with a zero net position. When a 
market-maker receives a central bank intervention order that conveys private 
information about the fundamentals, he may take speculative inventory positions to 
profit from his informational advantage (information channel) and try to unload his 
undesired inventory imbalance (inventory channel) to other market-makers. This trading 
behavior sparks hot-potato trading hypothesis, a repeated passing of inventory 
imbalances among market-makers. 
In executing intervention operations, central bank can either deal with commercial 
banks or place limit orders to brokers. In dealing with commercial banks, central bank 
allows them to make the intervention information public. On the other hand, in dealing 
with brokers, central bank can delay the market revelation of the intervention. Since the 
mid-1980s, most G-7 central banks deal directly with bank dealers to allow for a more 
rapid information flow about intervention activities. Thus, we assume that central bank 
intervention orders are placed to commercial bank dealers. 
In our model, we include two important features of the foreign exchange market, the 
heterogeneity of traders and interaction between traders. First, traders have 
heterogeneous horizons and expectations. Some traders such as market-makers may not 
be allowed to hold open positions overnight while others such as portfolio managers will 
be taking positions on a much longer-term basis. Second, since traders react to others’ 
behavior in terms of the information that is passed and inferred, interaction between 
traders plays an important role in determining the dynamics of exchange rates. 
 
2.1.    The Heterogeneity of Traders 
 
There are three types of traders in our model: central bank, portfolio managers, and 
market-makers. Central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to counter 
disorderly exchange rate movements. Portfolio managers are individual currency 
investors, offshore hedge fund managers, and other international portfolio managers. 
Market-makers represent dealers for commercial and investment banks who are involved 
in every transaction and quote the price. 
 
2.1.1.  Central  Bank 
 
Central bank intervenes directly in the spot markets to counter disorderly market 
conditions. Disorderly markets are characterized by a substantial widening of bid-ask 
spreads, large daily exchange rate movements, perceptions that trading has become thin 
or highly uncertain, and, at times, judgments that market psychology was beginning to 
generate self-sustaining exchange rate movements. A common assumption in the 
literature is that central bank wishes to limit exchange rate deviations from a target level. 
To capture intervention carried out on account of a leaning-against-the-wind policy, the 
target exchange rate level can be thought of as representing past levels of the exchange rate. HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  109 
Quirk (1977) distinguishes intervention on account of a leaning-against-the-wind 
policy, given by   from intervention consistent with gliding parities 
calculated as a moving average of previous levels of the exchange rate which has the 
form   with 
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intervention expressed in the domestic currency and    is the spot exchange rate at time t. 
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) show that central banks use continuous interventions 





In this paper, we assume that the central bank targets the exchange rate: 
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where   is the net purchase of foreign currency by the central bank at time t, the 
positive parameter 
t C
ψ   indicates the intensity of intervention, and  is the 
predetermined target exchange rate unknown to the public.
T S
10 DUM is a dummy variable 
which is 0 if central bank decides not to intervene, 1 if it decides to intervene. Since 
intervention is an exogenous variable, other market participants have no learning 
mechanism about intervention policy. 
 
2.1.2.  Portfolio  Managers 
 
This group includes nondealer customers such as individual currency investors, 
offshore hedge fund managers, and other international portfolio managers. We define the 
portfolio manager’s demand for the foreign currency, , as a weighted average of 
demand by fundamentalist’s view,  , and noise trader’s view,  ,
t P
t F t N
11
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where  λ   is the weight given to fundamentalist’s view. 
Frankel and Froot (1990) assume that past returns determine the dominant view. This 
can result in explosive foreign exchange movements. On the other hand, De Grauwe and 
Dewachter (1992) assume that the time-varying weight is endogenous and depends on 
 
9 Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) compare a three-days, five-days and seven-days moving average, 
respectively. They find that a seven-days moving average gives the best empirical results. 
10 Under the explicit target zone model such as EMS, target exchange rate is publicly known. However, it is 
unknown to the public under managed floating system. 
11 For a similar hypothesis, see Frankel and Froot (1990). WONCHANG JANG  110 
the deviation of the spot exchange rate from the fundamental level. That is, when the 
exchange rate continues to deviate from its fundamental level, fundamentalist’s view 
becomes more important. In this case, the exchange rate returns to the fundamental level 
eventually. 
In this paper, we assume that the weight on the fundamentalist’s view depends on the 
size of the central bank intervention because intervention tends to become heavy as the 
exchange rate deviates from the target level that is close to the fundamental level. As 
portfolio managers update their demand for a foreign currency based on market-makers’ 
price quote change, the proportion of opinions will vary with central bank intervention 
operations. For instance, when the central bank intervenes heavily and it affects 
market-makers’ quote, portfolio managers put more weight on fundamentalist’s view in 
their demand for a foreign currency. Thus, portfolio manager’s weight on the 
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where  ψ  indicates the extent of central bank intervention. When there is no 
intervention, portfolio managers use the minimum weight on the fundamentalist’s view. 
But, as they observe heavy interventions, the weight increases. 
 
Fundamentalists 
Fundamentalists are defined as investors who base expected returns on prices 
relative to perceived fundamentals. Fundamentalists believe that when the price of a 
currency is above the fundamental level, it will fall to the fundamental level, thereby 
selling the currency (and vice versa). Thus, the demand for a foreign currency by the 
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where the positive parameter  γ  denotes the intensity of the fundamentalist’s trading 








12 We assume the perceived fundamental level is constant within a day. This assumption can be justified 
because fundamentals pertain to low frequency data but the time span of our model is very short. HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  111 
 
Noise Traders 
Noise traders are investors who are not fully rational and are affected by their beliefs 
or sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamentals. Many of them are so-called 
chartists or positive feedback traders. Noise traders believe that if the price of a currency 
is on the downward trend, it will keep falling even when it is below the fundamental 
level, thereby selling the currency (and vice versa). Noise trading could result from stop 
loss orders, from portfolio insurance, from a positive wealth elasticity of demand for 
risky assets, or from margin call-induced selling after periods of low returns. 
A general form of demand for a foreign currency by noise traders is as follows: 
 
) )( ( 1 − − = t t t S S L N φδ ,                                               ( 2 - 5 )  
 
where  ) (L δ  is a lag polynomial. The positive parameter φ  denotes the intensity of 
noise trader’s positive feedback trading. This is consistent with the popular technical 
analysis in the foreign exchange market. In our model, we assume that  1 ) ( = L δ  for 
simplicity. That is, noise trader takes a serious view of most recent exchange rate 
movement: 
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By plugging (2-4) and (2-5)’ into (2-2), portfolio manager’s demand for a currency 
is defined as follows: 
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2.1.3.  Market-Makers 
 
In our model, the role of market-makers are essential because they are involved in 
every transaction and function as suppliers of liquidity in a market where buyers and 
sellers do not place their orders simultaneously. In the foreign exchange market, 
market-makers receive private information from nondealer customers’ order flow. Since 
each market-maker has sole knowledge of his own customer order flow, private 
information can be exploited in interdealer trading. 
Burnham (1991) notes “when a market-maker is hit with an undesired inventory 
position, he seeks to restore his own equilibrium by going to another market-maker or 
the broker market. A ‘hot potato’ trading has begun, which is the search process for a 
counterparty which is willing to accept a new currency position that accounts for a good 
deal of the volume in the foreign exchange market.” If innovation in nondealer order 
flow, such as central bank interventions, causes repeated interdealer trading of 
idiosyncratic inventory imbalances, the central bank may propagate the effect of WONCHANG JANG  112 
intervention by placing orders to a market-maker who has the reputation of dealing with 
a particular currency in the market. 
We assume that a market-maker’s price quoting function is expressed as a function 
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where    is the market-maker’s current inventory position and   is  the 
market-maker’s target inventory position at time t+1. The positive parameter 
1 + t I
*
1 + t I
κ  is 
market-maker’s price adjustment coefficient. 
In the following sections, we analyze the evolution of the exchange rate during the 
daily trading. In Section 2.2, we discuss the case of no central bank intervention. Section 
2.3 shows the influence of central bank intervention on the intradaily exchange rate 
movements. Any round of a daily trading is divided into two stages; morning session 
and afternoon session. We assume that market-makers have zero open (square) position 
at the start of the trading. 
 
2.2.  Intradaily  Exchange  Rate  Movements in the Absence of Intervention 
 
A market-makers sets price in response to excess demand or supply and at this price 
meets excess demand from his inventory or accumulates inventory when there is an 
excess supply. In the absence of central bank intervention, the weight of the 
fundamentalist’s view on the portfolio manager’s demand for a foreign currency is a 
lower bound  λ . That is, the portfolio managers heavily depend on the noise trading rule 
in placing their order. Since we assume that the portfolio managers do not have private 
information about fundamentals, their order flow does not affect the market-maker’s 
target inventory, but changes the market-maker’s current inventory position. 
Chart 1 provides an overview of the events and summarizes the information 




Chart 1.    Timing of Events in the Absence of Intervention 
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Morning Session 
When there is no central bank intervention, a market-maker receives the following 
order from a portfolio manager. 
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 − − − + − = t t t
f m
t Q S S S P φ λ γ λ .                                 ( 2 - 8 )  
 




t t t P S Q − − = κ .                                                  ( 2 - 9 )  
 




t t t S Q S Q γ λ κ φ λ κ φ λ κ γ λ κ + − − − + − = −1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 . 
 
Afternoon Session 
In the afternoon trading, a market-maker receives the following order from a 
portfolio manager, 
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Since the question of convergence versus divergence of the exchange rate path 
hinges on the values of the parameters, the intensity of fundamentalist’s trading  γ , the 
intensity of noise trading  φ , market-maker’s price adjustment speed κ , and portfolio 
manager’s minimum weight on the fundamentalist’s view λ , the conditions for 
convergence and divergence should be expressible in terms of the values of the 
parameters. 
 
2.2.1.  Numerical  Calculations 
 
In this section, we make some numerical calculations of the exchange rate path WONCHANG JANG  114 
under different market conditions to analyze the properties of the model. We start with 
following initial conditions:  ,  ,  , 110 1 = − t Q 120 = t S 100 =
f S κ =0.1, and λ =0.1. 
Figures 2.1~2.3 show the intradaily exchange rate movements for different values of the 
parameters. 
 
Influence of Portfolio Manager’s Trading Intensity (γ  and φ ) 
In our model, a change in the portfolio manager’s trading intensity has an effect on 
the intradaily movements of the exchange rate. When the portfolio manager’s trading 
intensity is weak (thin market), the exchange rate displays some mean reversion on an 
intraday horizon. When the market is relatively thin (e.g.,  1 = γ  and  1 = φ ), we have 
=120.70 (noon rate) and  =120.56 (closing rate). However, if the portfolio 
manager’s trading is intensive (
t Q 1 + t S
γ  and φ  larger than 3), we have a diverging daily 
movements of the exchange rate. For instance, in the thick market (e.g.,  10 = γ  and 
10 = φ ), we have  =127.00 and  =130.60. Thus, when the portfolio manager’s 
trading volume is sufficiently high, the exchange rate diverges on the intraday horizon. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between portfolio managers’ trading intensity and 
intradaily exchange rate movements. The dotted line represents a locus of a noon rate 
and the solid one is a closing rate. 
t Q 1 + t S
 
Influence of Market-Maker’s Price Adjustment Speed (κ ) 
Depending on the market uncertainty, market-makers tend to adjust their price 
adjustment speed. When the market is highly uncertain, risk-averse market-makers try to 
resolve inventory imbalance as soon as possible. Therefore, the price adjustment 
coefficient is assumed to increase as the market uncertainty increases. In general, 
market-makers widen bid-ask spread to protect themselves from informed traders. Thus, 
we can conjecture that market uncertainty at the opening and closing of the market is 
higher.
13 We see that an increase in  κ  has a bigger impact on the exchange rate in a 
thick market rather than in a thin market. For example, when  κ  increases from 0.1 to 
0.2,   rises from 120.56 to 121.22 in a thin market, but in a thick market same 
change in 
1 + t S
κ  causes    to move up from 130.60 to 152.40. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
effect of market-makers’ price adjustment speed on the exchange rate. The left (right) 
panel shows the effect in a thin (thick) market. 
1 + t S
 
13 Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) supports this argument. HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  115 
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Figure 2.2.    Influence of Market-Maker’s Price Adjustment Speed 
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Influence of Lower Boundary Value of Portfolio Manager’s Weight on Views (λ ) 
Consider the consequences of the increase in the minimum weight on the 
fundamentalist’s view in the portfolio manager’s demand. Increase in  λ  means  that  the 
portfolio manager relies more on the fundamentalist’s view. It helps reduce the 
fluctuation of the exchange rate path. The numerical calculation shows the influence of 
the change in  λ   is greater in a thick market rather than in a thin market. For example, 
if  λ  increases from 0.1 to 0.2,   falls from 120.56 to 120.02 in the thin market, 
while it drops from 130.6 to 122.4. Figure 2.3 shows the effect of portfolio managers’ 
minimum weight on the fundamentalist’s view. The left panel shows the effect in a thin 
market and the right panel in a thick market. 
St+1
 
2.3.  Intradaily  Exchange  Rate  Movements in the Presence of Intervention 
 
We now consider a two-stage sequential trading model when there is central bank 
intervention. In the morning session, central bank places intervention orders to 
market-makers (leaders).
14  The leaders take a speculative position to exploit 
informational rent and unload their undesired inventory imbalance to other 
market-makers (followers). Since the leaders’ order releases private information 
 
14 Dominguez (1997) finds that 61% of U.S. interventions occurred in the morning during 1989-1995. 43% of 
U.S. intervention against the mark occurred in the morning; 13% in the afternoon; 44% over the full day. 
Against the yen, 57% of U.S. intervention occurred in the morning; 16% in the afternoon; and 24% over the 
full day. HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  117 
contained in the intervention order to the dealer market, the followers adjust their target 
inventory level and try to unload their undesired inventory to other market-makers. It 
causes a hot potato trading among market-makers. At the end of the hot potato trading, 
market-makers share inventory imbalance through risk-sharing trades. In addition, 
market-makers receive orders from portfolio managers who do not know central bank 
intervention at this point of time. Thus, market-maker’s price quote at the end of 
morning session is determined by his inventory change caused by central bank 
intervention and portfolio manager’s morning order flow. 
In the afternoon session, portfolio managers receive a signal of central bank 
inte
 2 provides an overview of the events and summarizes the information 
ava
Chart 2.    Timing of Events in the Presence of Intervention 
 
orning Session 
xchange rate deviates from the target level, the central bank 
inte
rvention from the change in market-makers’ quote. After adjusting the weight of 
opinions in their demand for a foreign currency, portfolio managers place an order to 
market-makers. In addition, market-makers try to restore their original target inventory 
level which they had at the beginning of the trading in this stage. Thus, a 
market-maker’s price quote at the end of afternoon session is determined by both the 
level of his original target inventory position and portfolio manager’s afternoon order 
flows.  
Chart
ilable to market-makers for quoting and trading in each stage where there exists 
central bank intervention. 
 
 











When the spot e
rvenes by dealing directly with many large interbank dealers (leaders) 
simultaneously to buy or sell currencies in the spot exchange market. Since intervention 
orders contain private information about the central bank’s exchange rate target, the 
leaders take speculative positions by changing target inventory levels to exploit 
information rents. Thus, the leader’s inventory imbalance is the sum of central bank 
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re are n equally-sized market-makers in the dealer market, on average 
ma
When market-makers ex rience inventory imbalances, they usually shift 
alance on to other market-makers. There are some reasons why market-makers use 
interdealer trades; such reasons include market-makers’ desire to signal information or 
desire to change other market-makers’ behavior. Thus, the leaders seek to resolve their 
inventory imbalance by placing orders to other market-makers (followers). 
As inventory imbalances are passed from market-maker to marke
owers realize central bank intervention and adjust their target inventory position.
15 
The reason for the hot potato trading is that risk-averse market-makers do not want to 
carry open position. To attain the equilibrium price, market-makers need either to hold 
some of the inventory imbalance or to use the broker market. Since our model does not 
consider the broker market, we assume that market-makers share equal amount of 
inventory imbalance through risk-sharing trades to avoid the explosive hot potato 
process. 
If the
rket-makers possess the following amount of inventory imbalance at the end of hot 
potato trading, 
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ince portfolio managers are uninformed about central bank intervention in the 
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S
rning session, they place a morning order as follows: 
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15 The actual transaction prices are private information and are known only by the two participants in the 
transaction. Thus, the quotes on the news service screens such as Reuters Dealing 2000-1 system that is 
widely used for non-brokered interdealer trades are the only publicly available information on current prices 







































Since the Treasury Secretary typically confirms central bank intervention while the 
central bank is conducting the intervention operations and often statements that reflect 
the official stance on its exchange rate policy accompany the Treasury’s confirmation of 
intervention activity, the portfolio managers recognize the existence of central bank 
intervention at this stage. Thus, the portfolio managers ask quotes to market-makers, 
adjust the weights on the views, and then place orders to market-makers as follows: 
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In the afternoon session, market-makers try to restore their original target inventory 
level which they had at the beginning of the trading because risk-averse market-makers 
do not want to carry open positions. Thus, market-maker’s price quote at the end of 
afternoon session is determined by his original target inventory position and portfolio 
manager’s afternoon order flows. Thus, the market-maker sets the price in the afternoon 
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where    () κλγ φ λ κ − − + = Ω ) 1 ( 1.
By solving the second-order linear difference equation, we derive the equilibrium 
path of the exchange rate and its stability in the presence of intervention. The conditions 
for convergence and divergence of the exchange rate in the presence of intervention is 
determined by the values of the parameters,  ψ λ κ φ γ , , , , a n d  ω .  
 
2.3.1.  Numerical  Calculations 
 
In this section, we examine how the state of the market influences the efficacy of 
central bank intervention operations by making some numerical calculations of the WONCHANG JANG  120 
exchange rate path under different market conditions. We start with following initial 
conditions:  ,  ,  ,  , 110 1 = − t Q 120 = t S 100 =
f S 105 =
T S κ =0.1, and  λ =0.1,  λ  =  0.9, 
n= 100,  ω = 0.1. Figures 2.4~2.14 show the intradaily exchange rate movements for 
different values of the parameters. 
 
Influence of Portfolio Manager’s Trading Intensity (γ and  φ ) 
First, when the portfolio managers’ trading intensity is weak (this market), the 
exchange rate continues to diverge without intervention. Our numerical calculation 
shows that a proper amount of central bank intervention helps move the exchange rate 
toward the target level. To illustrate, we take the small values of the portfolio managers’ 
trading intensity, e.g.,  1 = γ  and  1 = φ . Without intervention, we have  =120.70 
(noon rate) and  =120.56 (closing rate). A small intervention (e.g.,
t Q
1 + t S ψ =6) induces 
=119.71 and  , while a heavy intervention ( t Q 26 . 117 1 = + t S ψ =46) induces  =113.11 
and  . Thus, heavy intervention is needed for the exchange rate to converge 
to target level within a day when the market is thin. The left panel of Figure 2.4 shows 
the influence of intervention intensity in a thin market. 
t Q
97 . 104 1 = + t S
Second, when the portfolio manager’s trading intensity is high (thick market), the 
exchange rate path diverges fast without intervention. For example, 10 = γ  and  10 = φ , 
we have  =127.00 and  =130.60 without intervention, ceteris paribus. In this case, 
small intervention helps the exchange rate to converge to the target level, but heavy 
intervention causes overshooting problem. For example, a small intervention (
t Q 1 + t S
ψ =6) 
induces  =126.01 and  , while a heavy intervention ( t Q 96 . 105 1 = + t S ψ =46) induces 
=119.41 and   that is far below the target level. Thus, a small 
intervention is enough to target the exchange rate when the portfolio managers’ trading 
intensity is relatively strong. The right panel of Figure 2.4 represents the influence of 
intervention intensity in a thick market. 
t Q 30 . 95 1 = + t S
In sum, our numerical calculations suggest that the optimal size of central bank 
intervention depends on the market depth. In the thin market, heavy intervention is 
needed, but small intervention is optimal in the thick market. This result seems to 
contradict to noise trading approach raised by Hung (1991) that suggests central bank 
intervention is more effective when the market is thin. HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  121 
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Figure 2.9.    Influence of Minimum Weight on Fundamentalist’s View in the Thin Market 
Figure 2.7.    Influence of Market-Maker’s Speculative Trading Intensity in the Thin Market 
 
  
Figure 2.8.    Influence of Market-Maker’s Speculative Trading Intensity in the Thick Market 
 





















0 0.2 0.4 0.6  0.8  1 
Qt
St+1








0 0.2 0.4  0.6  0.8 1
Qt 
St+1 


















0.6 0.8  1 
Qt
St+1
( 10 = =φ γ / with heavy intervention) 
100





4 5 0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
Qt 
St+1 
( 1 = =φ γ / with heavy intervention) 
Market-Maker’s Speculative Trading Intensity (ω ) 
exchange 
rate 
Market-Maker’s Speculative Trading Intensity (ω )
exchange 
rate 
Minimum Weight on Fun entalist’s View  dam (λ )HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  123 
  
 
Figure 2.10.   Influence of Minimum Weight on Fundamentalist’s View in the Thick Market 
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Influence of Market-Maker’s Price Adjustment Speed (κ ) 
e following numerical calculation shows that an increase in market-maker’s price 
adjustment speed generates overshooting phenomenon on the exchange rate below the 
target level. This result is opposite to that in the absence of central bank intervention 
because central bank intervention influences market-makers’ speculative inventory 
position and portfolio managers’ weight on the fundamentalist’s view. For instance, if 
the central bank tries to target the exchange rate using heavy interventions (
Th
ψ =46) in 
the thin market ( 1 = γ  and  1 = φ ), an increase in  κ  from 0.1 to 0.2 pushes down 
from 113.11 to 106.22 and  from 104.97 to 91.00 that is far lower than the target 
level. However, if the centra k reduces the size of intervention t
t Q  
1 + t S  
l ban oψ =6, an increase 
in  κ  from 0.1 to 0 to 114.54. We find that 
when the market is thin and an  i
.2 pushes down  t Q  to 119.42 and  + t S   1
 increase κ   n  from 0.1 to 0.2, the optimal size of 
intervention is  ψ =20 because it pushes  down to 114.80 and  to 106.11 that is 
close to the target level. Figure 2.5 shows the effect in a thin ma  The left panel of 
Figure 2.5 is the case of small intervention (
t Q   1 + t S  
rket.
ψ =6), and the right panel is for heavy 
intervention (ψ =46). 
As the market depth increases, the increase in market-makers’ price adjustment 
speed causes a bigger overshooting problem. For instance, when the market is thick 
0 (1 = γ  and  10 = φ ) and central bank intervention is small (ψ =6), an increase in  κ  
from 0.1 to 0.2 induces  to drop from 126.01 to 132.02 and   from 105.96 to 
85.05, ceteris paribus. Heavy intervention in the thick m  causes bigger 
overshooting effect, that is,  to 118.82 and  to 71.51. In this case, central bank 
can avoid overshooting by reducing th  size of intervention. For example, if 
t Q   1 + t S
arket
t Q   1 + t S  
κ   e
increases from 0.1 to 0.2 and the central bank uses smaller intervention (ψ =1.5),  t Q  
drops to 133.51 and  1 + t S   to 105.53 that is close to the target level. Figure 2 ows the 
effect i mar ure 2.6 is t e w
.6 sh
he cas henψ =6, and the righ n a thick  t. The left panel of Fig ke t 
panel is forψ =46. Our results suggest that when the market-m ase their price 
adjustment speed, central bank must reduce its size of intervention to target the 
exchange rate. 
 
Influence of Market-Maker’s Speculative Trading Intensity
akers incre
 (ω ) 
An increase in market-makers’ speculative trading intensity occurs when the 
market-makers respond to intervention news more sensitively by holding more 
speculative positions. We find that the increase in the market-maker’s speculative 
trading (ω ) induces overshooting exchange rate movements. When  ω  increases from 
0.1 to 0.2 in the thin market ( 1 = γ  and  1 = φ ) with heavy n  i tervention (ψ =46), 
drops from 113.11 to 106.21 an 104.97 to 91.70, small intervention (
t Q  
d  1 + t S   from  ψ =6) 
drop   to 118.81 and  to 115.51. Thus, in the thin market, central bank can  t Q 1 + t S  HOW TO INTERVENE IN FX MARKET  125 
effectively target the exchange rate by reduc
dropping 
ing the size of intervention to 20, thereby 
to 114.40 and  to 107.08 that is close to the target level. Figure 2.7 
shows the effect of market-makers’ speculative trading intensity on the exchange rate in 
a thin market. The left (right l shows a small (heavy) intervention case.   
However, the effect of 
t Q   1 + t S  
) pane
ω   in the thick market is not significant when intervention is 
small. For example, when  ω   increases from 0.1 to 0.2 in the thick market ( 10 = γ  and 
10 = φ ) with small interve on ( nti ψ =6),  drops from 126.01 to 125.11 and
from 105.96 to 104.68. However, heavy intervention in the thick market causes 
overshooting, thus   drops to 112.51 and   to 86.79. Figure 2.8 shows the 
influence of market-makers’ speculative trading intensity on the exchange rate in a thick 
market. The left (right) panel shows a small (heavy) intervention case. Our results 
suggest  e 
m
fluence of Boundary Values of Portfoli
t Q     1 + t S  
t Q 1 + t S
that central bank must reduce the amount of intervention when th
arket-maker increases his speculative trading, especially in the thin market. 
 
In o Manager’s Weight on Views (λ ,λ ) 
n the weight on the fundamentalist’s vi
crease in the lower boundary value of 
Consider the consequences of the change i ew 
in the portfolio manager’s trading. An in λ ,  λ , 
amplifies the effect of central bank intervention. This is because more fund ental 
trading induces faster convergence. However, Figure 2.9 shows that the effect is not 
significant in the thin market. However, it becomes significant in the thick ma (see 
Figure 2.10). On the other hand, a decrease in the upper boundary value 
am
rket 
λ  has 
different effects on the exchange rate movements. Figure 2.11 shows that the effect is 
not significant in the thin market. However, it becomes significant in the thick market 






hus, we see a larger effect of the change in
e portfolio managers’ weight on the fundamentalist’s view in the thick market. 
 
 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has explored whether the state of the foreign exchange market at the 
moment of central bank intervention operations matters based on market microstructure 
framework. Making numerical calculations and graphical illustrations, we analyzed the 
impact of parameters in the model on the exchange rate movements. In Section 2, we 
analyzed the relationship between the efficacy of central bank intervention operations 
and the state of th eign ex ge market. 
Our model specifies tw ain features of the foreign exchange market, the 
heterogeneity of traders and interaction between traders. Our model sug ests that central 
bank intervention affects two main traders in the foreign e ange market. First, central 
bank intervention influences market-makers’ behavior through two channels, 
information and inventory channels. Information channel works when intervention WONCHANG JANG  126 
orders influence market-makers’ speculative position. Inventory channel works when 
market-makers unload their inventory imbalanc  through changing their quote. Second, 
intervention i fluence
e
n s portfolio managers’ behavior. When the portfolio managers 
rec
The tion e






arket-makers speculate heavily on intervention orders, central bank 








ognize central bank intervention, they put more weight on fundamentalist’s view in 
their demand for a foreign currency. 
 implica  of our model is that the characteristics of the exchange rat  
movements around centra bank intervention is determined by th arameters in the 
model such as portfolio managers’ trading intensity and their boundary weights on the 
fundamentalist’s view, market-makers’ price adjustment speed and their speculative 
trading intensity. First, whe the portfolio m ers’ trading intensity is low (thin 
market), central bank must operate heavy interventions to move spot exchange ra  
toward a target level. When the portfolio managers’ trading intensity is high (th  
market), however, re ely small interventions help move the exchange rate toward the 
target level, but heavy interventions cause overshooting problem. Sec d, an increase in 
the market-makers’ price adjustment speed causes overshooting problem. Thus, when 
the market-makers adjust so fast, central bank must operate small interventions. Third, 
market-makers’ speculative trading strengthens the efficacy of intervention operations. 
Thus, when the m
st reduce the amount of intervention. Finally, as the portfo  
ght (minimum or maximum) on the fundamentalist’s view increases, the influence of 
intervention increases. The impact of weight is bigger in the thick market rather than in 
the thin market. 
Overall, the results of the model in this paper suggest that central banks need to have 
superior information on the characteristics of the foreign exchange market at the time the 
intervention operations are performed. M over, this paper suggests t at furt r 
theoretical and empirical explor n of the market microstructure of the fo ign 
exchange market is warran  to explain the exchange rate movements. First, it is worth 
developing a theoretical model of risk-sharing trading among market-makers. Second, 
high frequ cy data may enab e us to investigate the microstructural impact of central 
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